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1. Introduction
Although neither legal order deliberately set out to deal with complex matters of labour law, the 
European Union (EU or Union) and the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR or 
Convention) have both had a large impact, in one way or another, on labour law matters. By creating 
an (admittedly complex) external supervisory system to review the legality of EU action, while also 
internalising the values the Convention within the EU legal order, the Union’s formal accession to 
the ECHR is an(other) important ‘constitutional’ moment for the EU in several respects, all of which 
deserve careful consideration. In the field of labour law in particular, an embedded inclusion of human 
rights-type guarantees into the EU legal order has long been advocated by many commentators to 
counterbalance a perceived prioritisation of market freedoms. This chapter seeks to understand how 
accession will affect the EU legal order, building on three ‘constitutional’ models through which we 
can understand EU law and the ECHR. In what way will accession affect our ‘constitutional’ 
understanding of the Union, and how will this affect labour law?
Much constitutional theorising regarding the EU has focused on two broad models of constitution: a 
hierarchy-based model which stems from the ‘autonomous’ nature of EU law and the ‘constitutional’ 
role of the EU Treaties, and a value-based model which considers the interaction of competing legal 
sources and their principled resolution. It will be argued that while the ECHR will not affect the 
hierarchical ‘supremacy’ of EU law by virtue of the ECHR’s particular legal structure, its new 
supervisory role and embedded constitutional values will inevitably impact upon labour law in the 
EU. However, this chapter argues that a third, much neglected, model of constitution must be grasped 
to understand the place of labour law in the EU. Labour law is here presented as part of an industrial 
constitution, stressing the law’s constitutive function with regard to social actors and the market. It 
will be demonstrated that the impact of rights-based judicial supervision of the Union will be 
inherently limited on the industrial constitution, as this supervisory structure embodies a purely 
liberal vision of constitutional review which can police actors and norms, but cannot directly 
reconstitute market actors according to constitutional values such as democracy, dignity or solidarity. 
1 Special thanks to Theodore Konstadinides for his typically insightful comments on an earlier draft of this chapter. 
All errors are my own.
As significant as the ‘constitutional moment’ of accession might be, transformative reform of EU 
labour law is unlikely to come, in the first instance, from accession to the ECHR, and is ultimately 
dependent on a legislative restructuring of the internal market of the EU, and in particular an 
incorporation of values of citizenship into the market. Accession my cast light upon the need for such 
reforms, but is intrinsically limited in its ability to achieve these changes. 
2. The impossible exclusion of labour law from the post-war European legal settlement
Both the ECHR and the EU owe their genesis to efforts to avoid the horrors of the first half of the 
Twentieth Century in Europe in the form of gross violations of human dignity by totalitarian regimes 
and war of devastating dimensions and consequences. They represent two legal methods of achieving 
these laudable aims: on the one hand, the protection of rights of the individual through the Convention, 
and, on the other hand, the fostering of economic integration and prosperity through the European 
Economic Community (EEC), which would eventually evolve into the European Union, which would, 
it was hoped, create the interdependence and wealth which would thereby avoid the social and 
political conditions which culminated in the Second World War. 
That these two crucial European legal frameworks should come together is of course of great import, 
however the relevance of this development to labour law in Europe is a complex issue, not least 
because the deliberate exclusion of labour law – broadly speaking, that law governing the rights of 
workers and their production – was central to the both the Convention and the Treaty of Rome. The 
Convention was concerned with civil and political rights, rather than ‘social’ ones, while the EEC 
attempted to found market integration on the free movement of the factors of production and the 
principles of free competition, leaving issues of social policy and social justice to Member States. 
Both of these attempts to exclude matters of social policy and labour law has proved impossible to 
maintain, with both legal orders dealing extensively with matters of labour law in numerous 
significant ways.
The content of Treaty of Rome, founding the EEC, largely reflected the conclusions of the Spaak 
Report2, rejecting a general harmonisation of social provisions in the newly integrated market. The 
EEC would be based instead on a division of competences between Member States and the 
Community, the latter dealing with economic integration, while the former continued to take care of 
workers’ rights, employment regulation, and general issues of ‘social justice’. Fears that differences 
between such social conditions would create distortions in competition between countries were 
largely rejected3, as were similar concerns about the downward pressure on social standards that 
might ensue from such a division of competences. Over the next half-century or so, this division 
between economic and social competences progressively collapsed. As the project to fully integrate 
the market gained pace, there was a realisation that coordinated action was required to achieve the 
2 Rapport des chefs de délégation aux Ministres des Affaires étrangères: Comité intergouvernemental 
créé par la Conférence de Messine, Brussels, Belgium, The Secretariat, 1956
3 Famously, the matter of equal pay between men and women was included in Art 119 TEEC, largely 
upon the insistence of France.
social aims of the Member States to avoid a so-called race-to-the-bottom in terms of social standards, 
and also to give the European project a certain legitimacy through a concern for ‘social’ matters and 
the representation of workers4. As the EEC passed through its various stages of development5 and 
became the European Union, it gained numerous competences in the field of labour law6, and the 
‘Social Partners’ – trade unions and employers associations – achieved a form of corporatist 
legislative status within the Union7. 
The most significant substantive legal developments first came in the field of equality and 
discrimination, with the Court of Justice taking a leading role, ‘discovering’ a dual ‘social’ purpose 
to Art 119 TEEC8, which mandated equal pay for men and women, in Defrenne9. Expanded grounds 
and extensive secondary legislation on equal treatment10 led eventually to the principle of equal 
treatment becoming a ‘fundamental right’ and ‘general principle’11 of EU law in the eyes of the Court. 
Other significant fields of legislative activity came in the form of rights in the case of business 
restructuring12, seeking to allay the fears of the social consequences of the mobility of capital that 
comes with an integrated market, the establishment of limited representative structures within firms13, 
limits on working time14, and protection for categories of atypical and vulnerable workers15. A 
significant body of legislation, case law and principles which can very coherently be labelled ‘EU 
employment law’ has unmistakably emerged, notwithstanding the continued exclusion of key matters 
such as pay, collective bargaining and the right to strike from Union competences.16
4 On the general ‘legitimating’ function of EU labour law, see Antonio Lo Faro, Regulating Social 
Europe (Hart 2000)``
5 The stages of this development are generally understood as having the following key stages: the 
completion of the single market in the Single European Act (1986), the Maaschricht Treaty (1992), which created 
the European Union and expanded numerous competences, a trend continued in the Amsterdam Treaty (1999), 
culminating in the current Treaty settlement, following the Lisbon Treaty (2007), after the failure of the 
Constitutional Treaty.
6 These are currently contained in numerous parts of the TFEU, notably Article 19 on discrimination, 
and provisions in Titles IX and X, on employment and social policy, in particular Articles 153, covering numerous 
areas of employment regulation, and 157 on equal pay and equal treatment for men and women.
7 Articles 154 and 155 TFEU.
8 Now Article 157 TFEU
9 Defrenne v Sabena (No 2) (1976) C-43/75, in particular at paras 8-12
10 Article 19 TFEU gives the EU competence to pass legislation on equal treatment on numerous 
grounds beyond gender. Key Directives include the Race Directive 2000/43, on which see Luke Mason, ‘The 
Hollow Legal Shell of European Race Discrimination Policy: The EC Race Directive’ (2010) 53 American 
Behavioral Scientist 1731–1748; the Framework Directive 2000/78, covering other grounds of discrimination 
mentioned in Art 19 TFEU; and the now substantially revised Recast Equal Treatment Directive 2006/54 covering 
sex discrimination in employment, consolidating more than three decades of secondary legislation in this area.
11 Mangold v Helm (2005) C-144/04, in particular at paras 75 and 76.
12 Now in the form of the Collective Redundancies Directive 98/59 and Transfer of Undertakings 
Directive 2001/23.
13 Now the Information and Consultation Directive 2002/14 and European Works Council Directive 
2009/38.
At the same time, demonstrating perhaps the sheer conceptual impossibility of separating economic 
and social rights, as the original compromise had envisaged, EU law has not only sought to allay fears 
of social dumping, but has in fact declared aspects of the labour law traditions of certain countries 
illegal according to Union law by virtue of their constituting a barrier to economic freedoms 
recognised in primary or secondary legislation of the Union17.  The chapter by Amy Ludlow in this 
volume ably details these developments and their significance. Similarly, the ongoing financial crisis 
has resulted in action by the EU whose conditions require the dismantling, or bypassing, of domestic 
legal provisions which grant rights of representation to workers, notably in Greece.18 Through 
positive and negative integration, therefore, EU law has come to concern itself with fundamental 
aspects of labour law, the law regarding the formation of employment relationships and their 
regulation, terms and conditions. Any hopes of exclude labour law from the project of the EU were 
naïve and have proved illusory.
A parallel history of the Convention can be recounted in as much as it sought to exclude matters of 
‘social’ justice such as employment rights and labour law in general. While the fledgling Council of 
Europe sought to include fundamental political and civil rights in the Convention, social rights, such 
as those connected to employment and its terms and conditions, were instead eventually included in 
a later document, the European Social Charter, adopted in 1961, which has much less robust in its 
mechanisms of enforcement and supervision, even in its more recent revised form19. However, just 
as the distinction between market and social rights proved to unworkable in the case of the EU, so 
has the expectation that social issues would remain outside the purview of the Convention proved to 
be somewhat unrealistic. This is unsurprising. While at first glance there is perhaps little in the 
Convention which suggests immediate relevance to employment rights and labour law in general,  
this would be to underestimate the basic foundational place of civil rights in the legal construction of 
the employment relationship and the importance of political and civil rights to the values which 
inform labour law standards and, indeed, the Social Charter itself. This has been reflected in a growing 
body of case law before the ECtHR which deals explicitly with labour law issues and draws upon 
Convention rights to provide solutions to such cases. 
The basic tenets of the labour market and the employment relationship, that is the contract of 
14 Revised Working Time Directive 2003/88.
15 Part-time Work Directive 97/81, Fixed Term Work Directive 99/70, and Temporary Agency Work 
Directive 2008/104 which offer protection largely on the basis of equal treatment with typical workers in certain 
respects.
16 Article 153(5) TFEU explicitly rules out Union secondary legislation in the field of ‘pay, the right of 
association, the right to strike or the right to impose lock-outs’.
17 Significantly, the recent line of cases: line of cases Viking [2008] IRLR 143, Laval [2008] IRLR 160, 
Rueffert,C-346/06 and Commission v Luxembourg C-319/06.
18 For a detailed exploration of the impact on Greek labour law of the financial crisis and the Greek 
bailout see A. Koukiadaki and L. Kretsos, ‘Opening Pandora’s Box: The Sovereign Debt Crisis and Labour Market 
Regulation in Greece’ (2012) 41 Industrial Law Journal 276–304.
19 The Revised European Social Charter (1996) which came into force in 1999.
employment and the managerial prerogative to direct workers and the business generally, upon which 
all terms and conditions of employment are built, rest on two basic Conventions rights: on the one 
hand, the prohibition of slavery and forced labour20, which necessitates the contract of employment 
as the basis of employment relationships, and, on the other hand, the right to property21, which founds 
the basic managerial prerogative within employment relationships. Above and beyond this, the 
relationship of subordination which exists in the employment context means that the employer wields 
a form of bureaucratic power22 should be subject to the supervision of correlative forms of power 
wielded by state institutions, such as the right to a fair trial23, or the right to a private life24 which 
ensure that decisions taken by the employer, such as those concerning hiring or dismissal, are based 
on proper consideration of relevant factors and are not simply arbitrary. Indeed, the relevance of the 
majority of Convention rights to labour law can easily be made. All this before even mentioning 
Article 11 and the Right to Freedom of Association, which explicitly provides for ‘the right to form 
and to join trade unions for the protection of his interests’. As a consequence, any distinction between 
civil and social rights has been impossible to maintain, and the deliberate separation of these two 
species of right into different legal regimes within the Council of Europe has not had the effect of 
excluding labour law issues from the Convention’s reach. This is to be expected: just as there can be 
no conceptual separation between market and social rights, there can be no a priori distinction 
between civil and social ones.
What this potted legal history demonstrates, beyond the somewhat glib observation that the 
distinctions between such ‘types’ of right are likely to fail, is that the accession of the EU to the 
Convention is likely to have an impact on labour law in some manner or another. This impact is 
however likely to be conditioned and complicated by the secondary place which labour law and social 
rights have, in one way or another, in the traditions of the EU and the Convention, as explained in 
this opening section.
3. The ‘Constitutional’ Ramifications of Accession
The accession to the ECHR by the European Union is a complex issue however one approaches it. 
The Accession Agreement25 itself is an appropriately Byzantine affair, with its special procedures 
seeking to balance effective protection of rights for individuals on the one hand with, on the other, 
the complexities of the relationship between EU law and Member State law as the curious 
20 Article 4 ECHR.
21 Article 1 of Protocol 1 of the ECHR: the Protection of Property.
22 On this point see Hugh Collins, ‘Against Abstentionism in Labour Law’ in J. Eekelaar and J. Bell. 
(eds) Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence: third series (Clarendon, Oxford, 1987). On the genesis of this perspective see 
Karl Renner, The Institutions of Private Law and their Social Function (trans.) (Routledge, London, 1976) and the 
work of Hugo Sinzheimer, see below.
23 Article 6 ECHR
24 Article 8 ECHR
25 _Footnote to be inserted by editors_
constellation of different judicial bodies and their appropriate jurisdiction.26 In essence, the accession 
would seem to confirm the previous approach in terms of Member State responsibility, as Masters of 
the Treaties, for the violation of Convention rights by EU Primary Law27, while making the EU liable 
for violations which come as a consequence of its own action, thus possibly making more robust the 
scrutiny offered in Bosphorus28 where Member States pass on their responsibility for Convention 
rights to the Union, while closing the lacuna in cases such Connolly29, where action taken by the EU 
itself was not covered by the Convention at all. This Chapter does not seek to engage with these 
procedures in detail, but rather discuss the accession in more general terms of the nature of the process 
of European integration, in order that its impact on labour law might be understood in a systematic 
fashion. 
Aside from the obvious differences in content and core telos between the basic projects of the 
Convention on the one hand on and the Union on the other, the dominant narrative regarding their 
nature and functioning have also differed markedly. The Convention, although extremely successful 
in its own terms30, has been understood along classic Public International Law lines, with the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) operating as a curious inter partes court of last resort 
offering protection of rights but possessing no supervisory function with regard to the compatibility 
of laws in general. As a consequence, while the Convention is structured in the form of a 
‘constitutional’ Bill of Rights, with the inherent normative vision typical of a Constitutional document 
the Convention and its application cannot generally viewed in strongly ‘constitutional’ terms31. 
This is in sharp contrast to the European Union, whose complex development and form is 
predominantly characterised as constitutional in some form or other. Constitutional discourse has 
won the ‘social constructionist race’32 to characterise our understanding of the Union, and the 
infamous derailment of the Constitutional Treaty has done nothing to change this. However, what it 
means to characterise the Union in constitutional terms is far from clear, as this term is used by 
26 For excellent coverage of this matter see T Lock, ‘EU Accession to the ECHR: Implications for the 
Judicial Review in Strasbourg’ [2010] European Law Review; T Lock, ‘The ECJ and the ECtHR: the future 
relationship between the two European courts’ (2009) 8 The Law and Practice of International Courts and Tribunals 
375.
27 This is a confirmation of the position in Matthews v. United Kingdom [GC], no. 24833/94, ECHR 
1999-I.
28 Bosphorus v. Ireland [GC], no. 45036/98, ECHR 2005-VI.
29 Connolly v. Various States, no. 73274/01, 9 Dec. 2008.
30 Keller and Stone Sweet, following an extensive research project into the impact of the ECHR, 
confidently declared the Convention to be the ‘the most effective human rights regime in the world’: H Keller and 
AS Sweet, A Europe of rights: The impact of the ECHR on national legal systems (OUP, Oxford, 2008).
31 On this matter see, in particular, the discussion of the nature of the ECHR and the Court’s non-
constitutional role in Wojciech Sadurski, ‘Partnering with Strasbourg: Constitutionalisation of the European Court 
of Human Rights, the Accession of Central and East European States to the Council of Europe, and the Idea of Pilot 
Judgments’ (2009) 9 Human Rights Law Review 57`
32 On the ‘constructionist’ nature of constitutional discourse and the way in which characterising legal 
developments as ‘constitutional’ influences their development, see M Avbelj, ‘Questioning EU Constitutionalisms’ 
(2008) 9 German Law Journal 1–26.
commentators to mean all manner of things, both descriptive and prescriptive33. It would seem that 
characterising the Union as ‘constitutional’ in nature, rather than an extended international trading 
bloc for instance, stems from the ‘autonomous’ status of EU law, famously proclaimed in Costa v 
ENEL by the Court of Justice, where EU law managed to pull itself up by its bootstraps, to declare 
that the Treaties constituted a ‘an independent source of law’.34 In this way, the Treaties of the Union 
are ‘constitutional’ in nature not simply because they provide an ‘order’ to a complex institution, in 
the way in which a rowing club or political party would have a ‘constitution’, but rather because they 
are the apex of an autonomous legal system, which is constituted, i.e. created, by those very Treaties, 
rather than depending some other source for their validity. In this way, we can immediately see the 
contrast with the ECHR, as described above, which depends on the good will and peer pressure of its 
signatory states. 
The connected EU law doctrine of primacy, also an invention of the Court of Justice in Costa, and 
the ability of individuals to enforce their rights in domestic courts through the three-pronged 
enforcement mechanisms developed over the first three decades or so of the Union35, give a shape 
and form to this ‘constitutional’ vision of the the EU. The key upshot has been that the EU has insisted 
that matters of interpretation of EU law are a matter for the EU itself, and as such for the Court of 
Justice (CJEU), meaning that other judicial bodies, notably those of Member States36, but also 
international bodies37, cannot engage in such interpretive practices, at least from the perspective of 
EU law. At the same time, as an autonomous constitutional order, the EU is subject to international 
obligations only to the extent that the Court of Justice feels that these are in line with the fundamental 
principles of EU law.38 
Matters have not, of course, been as simple as this, reflecting law’s inescapably reflexive nature – the 
Hegelian master-slave dialectic between law and that which it seeks to regulate. An additional layer 
of constitutional complexity is added through interaction between the EU’s constitutional claims of 
autonomy and the competing constitutional claims of Member States to order the same legal space as 
33 An excellent discussion of some of these uses of the idea of ‘constitution’ in the EU context can be 
found in Kaarlo Tuori, ‘The Many Constitutions of Europe’ in Kaarlo Tuori and Suvi Sankari (eds), The Many 
Constitutions of Europe (Ashgate, Farnham 2010).
34 Flaminio Costa v ENEL [1964] ECR 585 (6/64), On autonomy and the ECHR see also the relevant 
discussion in Paul Gragl’s chapter in this volume. 
35 These doctrines, of direct effect, indirect effect and state liability, allowing legal persons to rely on 
rights stemming from EU law absent of correct implementation by Member States provide a concrete legal 
manifestation of the autonomous nature of EU law, giving effectiveness to its content without relying on 
implementation, at least in certain cases. The case CJEU case law in this regard is, famously, Van Gend en Loos 
(1963) Case 26/62 (direct effect), Marleasing (1990) C-106/89 (extension of the general duty of consistent 
interpretation of EU law), and Francovich (1990) C-6/90 (the principle of state liability for certain breaches of 
rights stemming from EU law).
36 Under CJEU jurisprudence only the Court of Justice can determine the correct interpretation of EU 
law, see for instance, Firma Foto-Frost 314/85[1987] ECR 4199. 
37 For instance the Opinion 1/09 of the Court of 08/03/2011 regarding the legality of a proposed 
European ptents court which would have had jurisdiction to interpret the content of EU law. This was held to 
violate EU law by the Court of Justice.
38 Kadi v Council & Commission C-402/05 [2008] ECR I-6351
the EU, with numerous national courts reasserting their right to police EU law.39 One might have 
expected this to lead to the collapse of the constitutional vision of EU law, however, the interaction 
of these constitutional claims and their resolution has itself been characterised as ‘constitutional’ in 
nature: that is, there is an autonomous, principled ordering of competing constitutional claims which 
can itself be meaningfully classed as constitutional. In the following section, there will be an 
examination of some of the values which are said to inform such an ordering: for now, we will focus 
on the structural elements of such claims. The idea that the resolution of competing constitutional 
claims is itself carried out along constitutional lines has been expressed rather prosaically as a 
‘Constitutional order of States’,40 but is most often referred to as ‘constitutional pluralism’41, where 
‘pluralism’ seems to communicate an ordered dialogue between competing claims of constitutional 
status which goes beyond a mere ‘plurality’ of such constitutional claims: a constitutional order of 
constitutions.
The key aspect of any such discussion, however, must remain the purported autonomy of EU law and 
the insistence upon the supremacy or primacy of EU law, regardless of any ‘constitutional’ dialogue 
with competing visions of the EU’s place in a hierarchy or legal systems. What this has involved has 
been the ability of the CJEU to determine the impact of other ‘constitutional’ claims, international 
obligations and other principled legal arguments based on rights-like discourse on the content of EU 
law, at times making room to accommodate them, while at others rejecting or marginalising them. 
This has been seen in labour law in the EU in significant ways. For instance, in the case of Jaeger42, 
the Court of Justice incorporated elements of fundamental rights discourse in order that the Working 
Time Directive be interpreted expansively to provide protection for doctors on call to have such time 
included in a calculation of the time they worked. Conversely, in the recent line of case law regarding 
the rights of trade unions to take industrial action43, the Court seemed equally willing to accept this 
form of argument, citing numerous international sources of collective and social rights44, but ruled 
that the action was nonetheless illegal according to EU law by virtue of its disproportionate impact 
on the economic rights of others.
The Court of Justice has, therefore, been willing to incorporate external, or non-binding, seemingly 
imperative sources of law, however this incorporation occurs on the CJEU’s own terms. The 
examples cited here are instructive in particular because the values which the Court of Justice sought 
39 This has most famously manifested itself in the Solange and controlimiti doctrines of the German and 
Italian Constitutional Courts. See ‘Solange II’ [1987] 3 CMLR 225 and the judgments 183/1973 and 179/1984 of 
the Italian Constitutional Court.
40 Alan Dashwood, ‘States in the European Union’, 23 ELR (1998) 201.
41 For good surveys of the ideas of constitutional pluralism and their application to EU law, see N 
Walker, ‘The idea of constitutional pluralism’ (2002) 65 Modern Law Review 317–359; MP Maduro, ‘Three 
Claims of Constitutional Pluralism’ in Matej Avbelj and Jan Komárek (eds), Constitutional Pluralism in the 
European Union and Beyond (Hart 2012); and Matej Avbelj and Jan Komárek, ‘Four Visions of Constitutional 
Pluralism’ (no date) 4 European Constitutional Law Review 524–527``
42 Jaeger C-151/02 [2003] ECR I-8389. The Court, in this case relied on the Community Charter of 
Social Rights of Workers, signed in 1989.
43 Cited above, at n 16, particularly in Viking and Laval.
44 In Viking and Laval, the Court placed emphasis on the content of the Convention and the Social 
Charter.
to incorporate into its judgments did not come from sources which were, at the time, formally 
incorporated into EU primary law. The pluralist constitutional framework proposed by so many 
commentators must be tempered by the autonomy and supremacy of EU law, however fragile and 
contingent on the cooperation of Member States’ courts this may be. 
How will the accession to the ECHR change this? This is a complex question, but one which is made 
more straightforward by the preceding paragraphs. There is something paradoxical, at least in 
appearance, in the accession to the ECHR by the European Union. On the one hand, the Union is 
opening itself up to scrutiny, both directly in terms of a review of its own secondary legislation and 
administrative action, and indirectly, but one might say existentially, through a formalisation of the 
Member States’ potential liability for Primary Law’ s being in violation of the Convention (the EU 
as an entity constituting a breach of a Convention right). On the other hand, while binding itself in 
this manner, it is seeking to maintain the crucial place of the autonomy and supremacy of EU law, 
upon which, one could argue, the whole edifice of European integration has rested. This paradox is, 
of course, revealed to be merely apparent when one appreciates the non-constitutional nature of the 
Convention as described above. Unlike the EU legal order, there is no suggestion, from the ECtHR 
or elsewhere, that the Convention founds a sovereign legal order, and as such offers no potential 
constitutional clash with the EU. In this way, it is not simply because the accession to the Convention 
stems from EU law itself that the autonomy of EU is not brought into question45, as such a line of 
argument would also mean that the EU itself could not possibly be an autonomous legal order itself, 
stemming as it did, as a matter of historical fact, from the actions of the Member States and within 
their constitutional frameworks. Law is not amenable to this form of historicist analysis: it 
normatively reshapes the social, or in this case legal, reality upon which it depends for its existence, 
otherwise one is committed to a static deterministic vision of law as simply a superstructure upon 
what preceded it, but which does not possess the capacity to alter or shape social or legal reality. 
Instead it is because there has been no ‘Costa moment’ in the ECtHR’s jurisprudence. The supremacy 
and autonomy of EU law is therefore unlikely to be brought into question because the legal order 
which the Union is acceding to does not seek to incorporate the EU its own constitutional ordering.
This does not mean that the accession is not an important constitutional moment for the EU. As 
mentioned above, all aspects of the development of the Union tend to be classified in some way or 
another as ‘constitutional’. What makes the accession important is the external supervision of 
conformity with the Convention rights, rather than this being a matter simply for the Union’s judicial 
hierarchy. This is where the paradox re-emerges: there will be a supervision of conformity with rights 
which stems from an external body, in a meaningful sense hierarchically superior, but which does not 
question the autonomy of EU law. What will be the impact of this development on labour law in the 
EU? It is of course hard to say to general terms, however, there are certainly tensions between the 
jurisprudence of the Court of Justice and that of the ECtHR in certain areas, in particular regarding 
equality46 and collective rights of workers to take collective action and able to collectively bargaining 
45 This is an argument proposed in Tobias Lock, ‘Walking on a Tightrope: The Draft Accession 
Agreement and the Autonomy of the EU Legal Order’ [2011] Common Market Law Review 1025–1054 ‘Since the 
autonomy of the EU’s legal order stems from the Treaties, explicit provisions in the Treaties cannot be in 
contradiction to it.’ (at 1037)`
46 For an excellent survey of some of these differences and their importance see S. Besson, ‘Gender 
Discrimination under EU and ECHR Law: Never Shall the Twain Meet?’ (2008) 8 Human Rights Law Review 
effectively47. The crucial impact will seem to be this: it will no longer be in the hands of the Court of 
Justice to decide the impact Convention rights on EU law. While the interpretation of EU law remains 
in the hands of the CJEU, and the autonomous and constitutional status of EU law remain in tact, the 
weight and shape given to rights will necessarily change within the EU legal order following 
accession.
Take, for instance, the right to take industrial action and collectively bargain recognised under Article 
11 on Freedom of Association of the Convention. While the Court of Justice recognised the 
importance of these rights in Viking and Laval, they were effectively reduced to the level of a ‘defence’ 
– a ‘legitimate aim’ in the familiar vernacular of the CJEU – which could only be pursued in so far 
as it did not disproportionately prejudice the economic rights of others. Accession to the ECHR and 
the supervisory role of the ECtHR will change this dynamic entirely, aside from the complex 
difference in understandings of the requirements of the right to freedom of association of the two 
respective courts. The new supervisory role of the ECtHR of the Union will mean that both the 
meaning of the content of the right, and the relative weight of any EU law provision which the 
exercise of the right appears to violate will be in the hands of the ECtHR rather than the Court of 
Justice.48  Similarly, in cases such as the Working Time Directive case mentioned above, which did 
not involve the invocation of a right as a legitimate aim but rather as an interpretative tool, it will be 
a matter for the ECtHR, rather than the CJEU to decide what the requirements of that right are. In the 
medium- to long-term this may well have a profound impact on elements of the labour law regime in 
the European Union. This potential impact is limited by several factors, however, first and foremost 
the ability to ground any legal argument on a Convention right.49 
4.Value-based Constitutionalism of the EU and Accession
Another version of the constitutional narrative of the European Union has developed, as mentioned 
above, along more normative lines, seeing a constitution as embodying something beyond mere form 
or function, and reflecting deep-seated values or goals. Given its normative basis, this discourse is 
perhaps better classified as ‘constitutionalism’. There have been countless versions of this type of 
constitutionalist vision of the EU, however these can be separated into two distinct, although 
overlapping types. 
The first is an attempt to characterise the telos, goal, aim or vision of EU law, or at least a part of it, 
647–682`. See also the chapter by Panos Kapotas in this volume on the specific issue of positive action.
47 K.D. Ewing and J. Hendy, ‘The Dramatic Implications of Demir and Baykara’ (2010) 39 Industrial 
Law Journal 2–51 and see also Amy Ludlow’s Chapter in this volume on the same tensions.
48 A similar observation is made in P Syrpis, ‘The Treaty of Lisbon: Much Ado… But About What?’ 
(2008) 37 Industrial Law Journal 219–235`
49 The right to ‘health and safety’ is of course not included in the Convention, however a plausible legal 
argument could be mounted on the basis, for instance of Article 8 on the right to a private and family life requiring 
an adequate work/life balance and therefore limited working hours. How far such arguments can be taken will now 
be a question for the ECtHR, to the extent that they fall within the scope of Convention rights.
and explain and justify its development through this telos. In this way, for instance, we can understand 
the economic constitutionalism50 of the Union, which predominated such discussions for a long 
period, reflecting the central place of the Four Freedoms and competition law in the Union’s Treaties. 
These discussions were subsequently displaced with a plethora of new ‘constitutionalisms’51 which 
sought to explain the expanding and evolving nature of EU law and integration, with new concerns 
for the environment, social justice, employment, security and so on. The telos-based constitutionalism 
thus becomes either fragmented, or hopelessly vague, like the long mission statement contained in 
Article 3 of the TEU. The power of such telos-based constitutionalism, from a legal perspective, is 
that it allows for a principled teleological interpretation of law. As the aims of the Union have become 
more complex, such a telos has become fragmented or obscured. 
The second broad type of ‘constitutionalism’ which has been used to characterise EU law is connected 
to the plurality of constitutional claims and the clashes between EU law and other legal systems 
discussed above. As was mentioned the ordering of these clashes have themselves been viewed 
through a constitutional lens in the form of constitutional pluralism. This ‘constitutional’ vision of an 
ordering of competing constitutional claims presupposes a system of coherent principles, which 
therefore themselves constitute a form of telos-like ‘constitutionalism’; they represent the values 
which can guide courts in resolving seemingly insoluble clashes between, primarily, national and EU 
constitutional law, with neither willing to give ground. Several accounts of such visions have been 
put forward, which tend to contain a complex mix of descriptive and prescriptive elements. 
Particularly influential versions include Weiler’s constitutional tolerance52, Kumm’s Dworkin-like 
interpretivist solution53, and Maduro’s speculations regarding the need for contrapunctual principles 
of law to resolve such constitutional conflicts.54 There is no need to go into the complexities of these 
arguments to understand their significance: in different ways, they propose ordered and principled 
solutions to the complexities of competing constitutional claims, seeking to balance coherence, 
consistency and other moral, political and legal values in different ways. In other words they offer a 
telos-based constitutionalism to order a plurality of constitutions and their competing claims.
Now, as argued above, despite appearances due to its Bill of Rights-like structure, and the new 
supervisory role of the ECtHR following the accession, the Convention will not add to this complex 
multiplex of constitutional claims. Unlike the EU, the Convention is not ‘constitutional’ in this sense. 
However, the Convention does possess, in a very strong sense, this second normative form of 
50 For the best survey of the ‘prescriptive’ version of the economic constitution of the EU, see Manfred 
E. Streit and Werner Mussler, ‘The Economic Constitution of the European Community: From ‘Rome’ to 
‘Maastricht’’ (1994) 5 European Law Journal 319–353`
51 An good survey can be found in Tuori, ‘The Many Constitutions of Europe’ (n 32)`
52 Joseph Weiler, ‘European Neo-constitutionalism: in Search of Foundations for the European 
Constitutional
Order’ 44 Political Studies (1996) 517.
53 Mattias Kumm, ‘The Jurisprudence of Constitutional Conflict: Constitutional Supremacy in Europe 
before and
after the Constitutional Treaty,’ 11 European Law Journal (2005) 262,
54 MP Maduro, ‘Contrapunctual law: Europe’s constitutional pluralism in action’ in N Walker (ed) 
Sovereignty in Transition (Hart, Oxford, 2003)
constitutionalism, being based of course on the inviolable rights of the individual and human dignity. 
In this way, the accession to the Convention by the Union is best seen as adding to the overriding 
constitutionalism, the fundamental guiding principles, of the Union rather than its constitutional, or 
ordering, role. The supervision of the ECHR and the binding nature of the Convention on the Union 
may therefore bring a more coherent picture of the meta-constitutional principles which constitutional 
pluralists discuss but which are rarely as evident as they suggest at present. In this way, they can 
provide the contrapunctual principles of Maduro’s vision of constitutional pluralism, or the 
appropriate moral perspective to perform the morally best-fit interpretation advocated by Kumm.
As is often the case when constitutional pluralism is raised, this discussion has quickly become 
extremely abstract and lacking in legal precision. A focus on how these reflections might affect 
European labour law might provide a method of correcting this. As the EU has expanded in terms of 
both the depth of the scope of integration, it has been faced with a series of connected challenges: 
market integration has caused the separation between Member State and Union competences to break 
down, requiring a balance to be drawn. At the same time, the expansion of Union competences, while 
incorporating more values into the corpus of EU law, has meant that no one clear telos can be 
attributed to the Union, making any such balance difficult to strike on a consistent, principled basis. 
This can be seen in terms of labour law. In the case of Albany55, regarding the question of the violation 
of EU competition laws by the seemingly cartel-like activities of trade unions, the Court was 
essentially required decide between the ‘economic constitutionalism’ of the Union and the reservation 
of such ‘social’ matters to Member States. In Albany, although somewhat confused in its reasoning, 
the Court effectively opted for the latter option. In stark contrast, in Laval, the Court refused to follow 
this form of reasoning and sought to resolve a similar tension between collective bargaining practice 
and free movement through a balancing of substantive rights. What is evident from these two 
opposing approaches is that the EU legal order, however constitutional in nature, and however in 
need of ordering principles to guide conflicts between competing constitutional claims, does not 
actually possess a clear set of guiding constitutional values. The compromise which was sought in 
the Treaty of Rome, whereby greater economic integration and wealth was promised in exchange for 
a separate economic Ordnungspolitik outside of the Member States’ competence, while Member 
States remained in charge of ‘social’ policy, broke down several decades ago. No single clear vision 
– no constitutionalist values – have sought to order this complexity. The accession to the Convention, 
given the supervisory role of the Strasbourg Court, might contribute to providing such values.
Alan Supiot has recently argued56 that the Convention ought to be given this role of guardian of the 
EU to ensure that legal matters are decided not by macroeconomic measurements but by metrics 
which have ‘human’ dimensions. When placed within this discourse of (missing) constitutional 
values and telos-driven constitutionalism, we can appreciate what Supiot means. Cases like Albany 
and Laval, regardless of their substantive outcomes, were decided according to two entirely different 
methods of resolving such ‘hard cases’. Discussions of constitutional pluralism ring somewhat hollow 
when cases which require such ‘pluralistic’ dialogue are decided according to seemingly random 
principles, which are hardly discernible from the text of the judgment at times. The accession to the 
55 C-67/96 Albany  [1999] ECR I-5751
56 Alain Supiot, L’esprit de Philadelphie: La justice sociale face au marché total (Seuil 2010), in 
particular Chapter 6 where Supiot discusses ‘le sens de la mesure’.
ECHR of the Union will, it is suggested, provide for a unifying discourse and interpretative method 
in complex constitutional cases. When combined with the supervisory role described above, one can 
envisage a more rights-driven approach to resolving labour law cases. As labour law cases tend to be 
of this hard ‘constitutional’ type, due to the fraught distinction between levels of competence 
discussed above, this will impact greatly on European labour law.
5. The Industrial Constitution and the inherently limited impact of the accession on labour law in the 
EU
The previous two sections have demonstrated the accession’s potentially profound impact on the way 
in which certain questions of labour law are approached, with the potential for qualitative changes in 
the content of EU labour law, both in terms of positive and negative integration. In general however, 
labour law has floundered somewhat in recent years, struggling to find its normative and conceptual 
moorings in a dominant political discourse which promotes economic efficiency and ‘flexibility’ on 
the one hand, and individual human rights on the other, both seemingly undermining labour law’s 
traditional concern for social solidarity and distributive visions of equality. One response to this has 
been to reconsider the very nature and purpose of labour law at all, with a renewed focus on 
Sinzheimer’s ideas of a labour constitution57. Dukes58 and Rödl59 in particular have sought to explain 
the inherently ‘constitutional function’ of labour law. This requires some explanation. Sinzheimer’s 
idea of the labour constitution was based on a development Renner’s insight60 that the legal 
institutions of the contract of employment and private property had developed into loci of social 
power and domination which existed by virtue of the fact that within an employment relationship one 
is subject to the direction of the employer due to the fact that the  object the contractual transaction is 
the worker himself or herself. In addition, the civil (i.e. private) law vision of contracting between 
equal parties is in reality subject to differences in market position which also constitute relative 
positions of social power. Sinzheimer developed the idea of the ‘labour constitution’61 from the 
insight that these private loci of power should be subject to the same constraints and principles as 
public power was in the political constitution. The labour constitution was thus made up of those legal 
norms which sought to counter balance, control and shape power in the private sphere, encompassing 
57 H Sinzheimer, Grundzuege des Arbeitsrechts, 2nd edition (Gustav Fischer, 1927), and ‘Die 
Demokratiserung des Arbeitsverhaeltnisses’ in Arbeitsrecht und Rechssoziologie (Europaeische Verlagsanstalt, 
1976)
58 R Dukes, ‘Constitutionalizing Employment Relations: Sinzheimer, Kahn-Freund and the Role of 
Labour Law’ (2008) 35 Journal of Law and Society 341–63; R. Dukes, ‘The Constitutional Function of Labour 
Law in the European Union’ in Neil Walker and others (eds), Europe’s Constitutional Mosaic (Oxford University 
Press 2011)`
59 Florian Rödl, ‘The labour constitution of the European Union’ in Armin von Bogdandy and Jürgen 
Bast (eds), Principles of European Constitutional Law (2nd edn, Hart 2009); Florian Rödl, ‘Constitutional 
integration of labour constitutions’ in Erik Oddvar Eriksen and others (eds), Law, democracy and solidarity in a 
post-national union: the unsettled political order of Europe (Routledge 2006).
60 Renner, The Social Function... (n 21).
61 Sinzheimer gave several names to overlapping ideas to do with ‘constititionalising’ certain aspects of 
private law in the employment context: Wirtschaftsverfassung (economic constitution), Betriebsverfassung (the 
constitution of the firm), Arbeitsverfassung (labour constitution). Here the term ‘labour constitution’ is used by 
virtue of this term being adopted in more recent literature, in particular that at n 57 and n 58.
elements such as the role of trade unions, collective bargaining, the right to strike, and other rights of 
the worker which limited or redistributed the managerial right to direct workers under the contract of 
employment. To a certain extent, there is nothing remarkable about these insights, as valuable as they 
are, when put in these terms. They represented simply the horizontal effect of constitutional principles 
and a recognition of the diffuse nature of power within a non-totalitarian legal system.62
However, the idea of the labour constitution can, and indeed should, be taken further. It is 
‘constitutional’ not merely because labour law applies constitutional values to the private, economic 
sphere, but rather because such laws constitute, i.e. legally found and order, that same sphere. The 
laws which provide for employment through a combination of the institutions of property and contract, 
along with those laws which provide for worker representation and industrial action, in the negotiation 
of terms of employment or in decisions regarding the strategic direction of a business, do not simply 
need to be subject to subject to constitutional values. Instead they must be seen as ‘constitutional’ in 
themselves, reflecting a structural coupling63 of the law and the economic sphere which enables 
working relationships to exist. In this way, the term ‘labour constitution’ does not quite render the 
idea, as this focuses simply on the corrective nature of labour law provisions. The ‘constitutional’ 
insight is much deeper: just as the EU is correctly characterised as ‘constitutional’ because of its 
legally autonomous nature, so the autonomous social sphere of the economy is constituted by the 
legal rules which create actors and processes which allow action. A term which captures this 
constitutional role of labour law within this broader economic constitution is the ‘industrial 
constitution’. 
Seeing labour law in these terms is crucial for a number of reasons. Firstly, it overcomes the latent 
materialism in much labour law commentary, which assumes that law merely modifies or interacts 
with an existing normative social reality which exists outside of the legal system.64 It recognises, just 
as the near contemporaries of Sinzheimer, the ordoliberals65, did, that the law does not simply regulate 
economic processes, but instead creates them through legal institutions which must be maintained, 
62 This broad idea is most clearly explained, and indeed defended, in M Kumm, ‘Who's Afraid of the 
Total Constitution - Constitutional Rights as Principles and the Constitutionalization of Private Law’  7 German LJ 
(2006) 341.
63 This term is associated with systems theory. For the relationship between law and social reality, see in 
particular Niklas Luhmann, Law As a Social System (Oxford University Press 2004); On Structural Coupling, see 
Teuber’s introduction to G Teubner (ed) Juridification of Social Spheres: A Comparative Analysis in the Areas of 
Labor, Corporate, Anti-Trust, and Social Welfare Law (Walter de Gruyter 1987)
64 This is a tendency found in early labour law, such as that of Otto Kahn-Freund (see, eg, Chapter 1 of 
Labour and the Law (Stevens, 1972) on law and power, which stresses law’s place as a ‘secondary force’) which 
reflected the reflections of ‘social lawyers’ and early legal pluralists such as Georges Gurvitch (see for instance 
‘Théorie Pluraliste Des Sources Du Droit Positif’ in Annuaire de l'Institut international de philosophie du droit et de 
sociologie juridique (1934-35)) and Paul Ehrlich (see his ideas on ‘living law’ in Fundamental Principles of the 
Sociology of Law. (Transaction, New Brunswick, [1913] 2003)) who suggested that the ‘law’ of work was not legal 
in source, as it did not emanate from the State, but was produced by autonomous social forces.  Indeed, in French, 
labour law is still often referred to as droit social. A similar tendency is found in much neo-liberal economic 
thought. The account of the constitutional nature of labour law defended here seeks to refute this claim.
65 For an exceptional survey of this ‘constitutional’ aspect of ordoliberalism see DJ Gerber, 
‘Constitutionalizing the Economy: German Neo-liberalism, Competition Law and the ‘New’ Europe’ (1994) 42 
American Journal of Comparative Law 25–84.
but can equally be modified if so required.66 The ordoliberals, whose ‘political’ ideas are  often seen 
as the source of the ‘economic constitutionalism’ mentioned in Section 4, above, recognised above 
all however that private law institutions performed a ‘constitutional’ role in the private sphere, an 
insight which often lost when discussing their work today; the economy did not simply run itself but 
was dependent on legal institutions which created that economy and allowed for its functioning. 
While the law is dependent on its acceptance by social actors, those social actors and their action is 
imaginatively recast in a fundamental way by the law. This once again shows the non-historicist 
nature of law, mentioned in Section 3 in relation to the autonomy of EU law, and demonstrates why 
labour law is part of an constitutional ordering of private actors, that is, actors who are created by law 
and whose interaction with other actors is equally constituted by the law.
What has this got to do with the accession of the EU to the Convention? Just as the potential 
significance of the accession could be seen through the first two constitutional models of EU law in 
this chapter,  by highlighting this third model of constitution, we can understand the place of labour 
law within the EU, and also the inherent limitations to the accession in terms of its impact on labour 
law in the Union. Despite the significant impact discussed above, the idea of labour law as primarily 
formed of an industrial constitution, that is, a deliberate legal ordering of actors in an autonomous 
economic sphere, should bring home immediately the limitations of accession. The Convention, and 
its application through the Strasbourg Court, reflects a certain vision of ‘constitutional’ values and 
their protection, one which could be described as pre-democratic or liberal, that is, which is 
concerned with policing the exercise of those who possess power  – whether social or political, private 
or public – to ensure that they do not abuse it by violating certain protected rights of others. This 
supervisory method does not question the power structures themselves, but simply seeks to avoid 
abuse. However, what framing labour as part of the industrial constitution allows us to appreciate is 
that the fundamental elements of labour law are in themselves related to the distribution of private 
power, of the ability of actors, individually or collectively, to negotiate the terms of their employment 
or enjoy a role in decisions regarding their work or the direction of the business which employs them. 
Many such institutions and actors exist in some diluted form in EU law, such the numerous Directives 
mandating right to information and consultation of workers in certain circumstances, mentioned 
above, and a legislative, or regulatory, role for the Social Partners, both general and sectoral. At the 
same time, much of this ‘constitutional’ function is still largely at national level, in particular given 
that issues of collective bargaining and industrial action are excluded from Union competence, as 
discussed above, and that the provisions on Social Policy contain a commitment to ‘take account of 
the diverse forms of national practices, in particular in the field of contractual relations’.67 
However, as Albany and Laval demonstrate, these issues are inherently matters of EU law. As a 
consequence, while, paradoxically for a legally constituted market, there exists no harmonised 
institutions of labour law in the Union, there are elements of an EU industrial constitution, and those 
elements which remain at state level are subject to EU law supervision. Given that the major tenets 
of labour law take this constitutional form, and the supervisory role which the accession gives the 
66 The unavoidably legal nature of social reality and of market foundations in particular is covered 
exceptionally lucidly in relation to changing American Supreme Court jurisprudence in Cass R Sunstein, The 
Partial Constitution (Harvard University Press 1994) in particular Ch 2
67 Article 151(2) TFEU 
Convention and the Strasbourg Court, there is little chance, on its own, that the accession will have 
any great impact on the major institutions of labour law in the EU. The upshot is this: as the major 
tenets of an industrial constitution are not part of the EU legal order – those legally constituted actors 
within the internal market – a supervisory model of rights protection cannot ameliorate or shape EU 
labour law, as its fundamental components are missing. This explains the difficulty which the CJEU 
faces in Albany and Laval: it is seeking to conceptualise with an epistemic framework of EU law, 
actors which have no foundational role. Any space which is found for them must be on the basis of a 
rights-type argument, which demonstrates both the importance but also the limits of the accession for 
European labour law.
This conclusion is unsurprising in many respects: it reflects the inherent limitations of rights-based 
juridical reasoning. Law, in its interaction with the social sphere, is constitutive in nature, and such a 
constitution must be the consequence of the deliberate legislative acts, a reordering of the social 
sphere through law. The Accession Agreement’s provisions confirming the liability of Member States 
for a violation of Convention rights by EU Primary Law offers an indirect transformative role in this 
regard: should the EU be found to be in violation of the right to freedom of association for instance, 
as Amy Ludlow’s Chapter in this volume suggests it might, pressure could mount for a redrafting of 
Union competences an inclusion of collective rights at Union level. More realistically however, 
Member States are likely to come under pressure to give a more regulatory role to the Social Partners 
within the state, thus conforming with the jurisprudence of both Courts, and mirroring the position of 
the Social Partners in the EU – reducing yet further trade union’s place in the European industrial 
constitution. This underlines the fact that a fundamental change to the industrial  constitution must 
take place through (primary) legislative action, which the accession to the ECHR may hasten but 
cannot bring about.
6. Conclusion. The place of citizenship and the limits of accession
Labour law in the EU will be affected by accession, perhaps in fundamental ways, with the 
constitutional supervision and constitutional values provided for in the Convention giving a structured 
and principled place for rights in the consideration of labour law cases. However, as a merely 
supervisory or pre-democratic model of rights-protection, the procedures and values provided for by 
accession can do little to reshape the industrial constitution of the European Union, that is the 
constitutional ordering of the social or economic sphere. In this regard, it is unwise to put faith in 
accession to make profound changes in EU labour law. These must be the consequence of legislative 
action, that is, a more deliberate attempt to order the social sphere in the Union by providing for the 
right to collectively bargaining and to take industrial action in EU law. While this would involve the 
application of many of the values contained in the Convention, a better model for any such change in 
the future is more likely to come from an extension of an existing concept of EU law, that of Union 
Citizenship68. While Citizenship has been used by the CJEU primarily to move away from purely 
economic interpretations of EU rights69, a recasting of labour law as constituting  autonomous private 
power, shows the need to imbue, rather than contrast, the market with the values of participation, 
68 Article 20 TFEU
69 E.g. Case C-184/99 Grzelczyk [2001] ECR I-6193.
dignity and democracy inherent in the idea of citizenship. A constitutional appreciation of citizenship 
means that it must be incorporated into the economic ordering of the EU, not merely be seen to exist 
alongside it. Convention rights can help draw our attention to any failure in this regard but are 
intrinsically limited in their ability to overcome these failures through judicial supervision alone, 
however ‘constitutionally’ significant. Accession will bring about an increased focus to the 
requirement to incorporate constitutional values into the European industrial constitution and provide 
supervisory structures to achieve this. However, there is a danger that this will reinforce the notion 
that the market is simply a matter of physis and nomos, an order tempered by rules, whereas in fact 
such structures are essentially a question of thesis, a deliberate ordering of actors which must 
incorporate constitutional values of citizenship into its very structures, something which cannot easily 
be done through judicial supervision alone. 
